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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy proﬁle that is immune to
joint deviations. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria have been deﬁned
in the literature. One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which
coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating
players receive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this note we show that an ex-
ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno D., Wooders J., 1996. Games Econ.
Behav. 17, 80-113) is immune to deviations at all stages of any pre-play signalling
process that implements it. Thus the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is
included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to playing a non-cooperative game,
inﬂuences the set of self-enforcing outcomes of that game. Communication al-
lows players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated strategy
proﬁle as a non-binding agreement. For such an agreement to be self-enforcing,
it has to be stable against coalitional deviations. Two notions in the litera-
ture describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong correlated equilibrium
is a correlated proﬁle that is stable against all coalitional deviations, while a
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is stable against self-enforcing coalitional
deviations (Bernheim et al., 1987). For a coalition of a single player, any de-
viation is self-enforcing. For a larger coalition, a deviation is self-enforcing if
there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper
sub-coalitions. The main focus of this note is on the former notion.
A correlated strategy proﬁle can be implemented by a mediator who privately
recommends each player which action to play. It can also be implemented by a
pre-play signaling process, a revealing protocol, that includes payoﬀ-irrelevant
private and public signals (sunspots). Each player deduces his recommended
action from the signals he has received. In the existing literature (referred to
below) it is assumed that all signals are simultaneously received by all players.
However, a revealing protocol may be more complex. Few examples are: The
recommendations may be revealed consecutively by private signals in a pre-
speciﬁed order (see e.g., the polite cheap-talk protocol that implement strong
correlated equilibria in Heller, 2008); Each private signal may include par-
tial information about the player's recommended action; The order in which
recommendations are revealed may depend on a private lottery.
So that a revealing protocol can implement a correlated equilbirum it should
satisfy two properties. First, at the end of the protocol each player should
know the action recommended to him. Second, no player should obtain any
information about the actions recommended to the other players, except the
conditional probability, given his own recommended action.
When all the players receive their recommended actions simultaneously, a
coalition of players may communicate, share their information, and plan a joint
deviation before, or after, the recommendations are revealed. In Milgrom and
Roberts (1996), Moreno and Wooders (1996), and Ray (1996) it is assumed
that players may only plan deviations at the ex-ante stage, before receiving the
recommendations. In Einy and Peleg (1995), Ray (1998), and Bloch & Dutta
(2008) it is assumed that players may only plan deviations at the ex-post stage,
after receiving the recommendations. 2
2 This stage is called interim stage in some of referred papers.
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When the players receive several signals, not necessarily simultaneously, they
may communicate, share information, and plan coalitional deviations at dif-
ferent stages of the revealing protocol. By sharing information, a coalition
of players may get information about the actions recommended to players
outside the coalition, and may use this information to implement proﬁtable
deviations. Similar to the existing literature of simultaneous revealing pro-
tocols, we focus on protocols in which sharing information among deviating
players does not allow them to obtain any information about the actions rec-
ommended to the other players, except the conditional probability, given their
own recommended actions.
The use of a joint deviation requires the unanimous agreement of all members
of the deviating coalition. A player agrees to be part of a joint deviation if,
given his own information the deviation is proﬁtable. His agreement to par-
ticipate in the joint deviation is a public signal to all the deviators about that
fact. Thus, if a joint deviation is implemented, then it is common knowledge
among the deviators that each of them believes that the deviation is proﬁtable
(see the example in Sect. 3 for more details). We model the information struc-
ture of the deviating players by an incomplete information model (with the
common prior assumption) a` la Aumann (1987).
In the spirit of the concept of strong correlated equilibrium, we assume that
deviations are binding: A deviation is implemented with the assistance of a
new mediator. The deviators truthfully report their information to the new
mediator, and they are bound to follow his recommendations, even if new
information at a later stage makes it unproﬁtable. If the deviators are not
bound to follow the new mediator's recommendations, the solution concept is
close in spirit to the coalition-proof notion.
A correlated strategy proﬁle is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium if, for
every revealing protocol that implements it, and for each stage of the protocol,
there is no coalition with a proﬁtable deviation. A correlated strategy proﬁle
is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno and Wooders, 1996) if no
coalition has a proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage. Our result shows that
the two notions coincide: an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is resistant
to deviations at all stages of any revealing protocol that implements it. This
implies an inclusion relation among the diﬀerent notions of strong correlated
equilibria, and a robustness of the ex-ante notion (as discussed in Sect. 6).
One could hope that similar results may be obtained for the coalition-proof
notions. However, in Sect. 5 we demonstrate that the ex-ante coalition-proof
notion is not appropriate when deviations can be planned at all stages.
A related work is the seminal paper of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) that
developed a few concepts of eﬃciency according to how much information is
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revealed and shared among the players. The result presented in Sect. 4-5 of
their paper, when being adapted to our framework, states that if a correlated
proﬁle is resistant to deviations of the grand coalition at the ex-ante stage,
then it is also resistant to such deviations at the ex-post stage. The contri-
bution of this note is twofold. First, the modeling of the diﬀerent kinds of
strong correlated equilibria by an incomplete information model a` la Aumann
(1987). Second, our result extends Holmstrom and Myerson's result in two
ways: we prove the resistance at all stages (not only at the ex-post stage), and
simultaniously against deviations of all coalitions.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the result.
The result is demonstrated with an example in Section 3, and proven in Sec-
tion 4. We deal with the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and discuss the
implications of the result in Section 6.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where
N is the ﬁnite and non-empty set of players. For each i ∈ N , Ai is player
i 's ﬁnite and non-empty set of actions, and ui is player i 's utility (payoﬀ)
function, a real-valued function on A =
∏
i∈N Ai. The multi-linear exten-
sion of ui to ∆ (A) is still denoted by ui. A member of ∆ (A) is called a
(correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-empty member of 2N .
Given a coalition S, let AS =
∏
i∈S Ai, and let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote
the complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated) S -
strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS) to
be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)/q(aS).
A state space is a probability space, (Ω,B, µ) that describes all parameters that
may be the object of uncertainty on the part of the players. We interpret Ω as
the space of all possible states of the world, B as the σ-algebra of all measurable
events, and µ as the common prior. Given a non-null event E ∈ B and a
random variable x : Ω→ X (where X is a ﬁnite set), let x(E) ∈ ∆(X) denote
the posterior distribution of x conditioned on the event E. The implementation
of an agreement (a correlated strategy proﬁle) by a mediator or by a signaling
process is modeled by a random variable a : Ω → A, which satisﬁes that the
prior distribution a(Ω) is equal to the agreement distribution.
Deﬁnition 1 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, and (Ω,B, µ) a
state space. A recommendation proﬁle that implements q is a random variable
a = (ai)i∈N : Ω→ A that satisﬁes: a(Ω) = q.
A (joint) deviation of a coalition S is a random variable (in Ω) that is condi-
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tionally independent of a−S given aS .
Deﬁnition 2 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that imple-
ments q. A deviation (of S from a) is a random variable dS = (di)i∈S : Ω→ AS
that is conditionally independent of a−S given aS .
The interpretation is as follows: If the players in S agree to use deviation dS,
they implement it with the assistance of a new mediator. The new mediator
receives the S -part of the recommendation proﬁle, but he does not receive any
information about the actions recommended to the other players. Thus, dS
may depend only on aS , but not on a−S .
When the members of a coalition S consider the implementation of a joint
deviation, they are in a situation of incomplete information: each player may
know his recommended action, and may have additional private information
acquired when communicating with the other deviating players. We assume
that the deviating players have no information about the actions recommended
to the non-deviating players, except the conditional probability given the in-
formation they have about their recommended actions. We model this by the
following deﬁnition of a consistent information structure.
Deﬁnition 3 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that im-
plements q. An information structure (of S ) is a |S|-tuple of partitions of Ω
(F i)i∈S, whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists
of non-null events. We say that (F i)i∈S is a consistent information structure,
if ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A, a (F i(ω)) (a) = aS (F i(ω))
(
aS
)
· q(a−S | aS).
We interpret F i as the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true
state of the world is ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of
F i that contains ω.
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviation is prof-
itable, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ when playing the original
agreement and when implementing the deviation. A player agrees to deviate,
only if the latter conditional expectation is larger. Formally, let G be a game,
q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition, i ∈ S a player, (Ω,B, µ) a state
space, a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle, dS : Ω → AS a deviation, and
(F i)i∈S a consistent information structure. The conditional expected payoﬀ
when all the players follow the agreement is:
uif (ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui (a(ω)) dµ
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The conditional expected payoﬀ when the members of S deviate, by imple-
menting dS, and the players in −S follow the agreement:
uid(ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
dµ
If the players in S unanimously decide to implement a deviation in some
state ω ∈ Ω, then it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player believes to
earn more if the deviation is implemented. In that case we say that the joint
deviation is proﬁtable. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4 (Aumann 1976) Let G be a game, S ⊆ N a coalition, (Ω,B, µ)
a state space, (F i)i∈S an information structure, and ω ∈ Ω a state. An event
E ∈ B is common knowledge at ω if E includes that member of the meet
Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i that contains ω.
Deﬁnition 5 Let G be a game. q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coali-
tion, (Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that
implements q. A deviation (of S ) dS is proﬁtable, if there exists a consistent
information structure (F i)i∈S and a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common
knowledge in ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). In that case, we say that dS is
a proﬁtable deviation (from the reccomendation proﬁle a) with respect to the
information structure (F i)i∈S.
We now deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy proﬁle,
from which no coalition has a proﬁtable deviation.
Deﬁnition 6 Let G be a game. A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage
strong correlated equilibrium if for every reccomendation proﬁle a : Ω → A
that implements q, no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation.
A proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a
proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage, when the players have no information
about the recommendations.
Deﬁnition 7 Let G be a game and (Ω,B, µ) a state space. A proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A)
is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if for every reccomendation proﬁle
a : Ω → A that implements q, no coalition S has a proﬁtable deviation with
respect to the ex-ante information structure (F i)i∈S that satisﬁes ∀i,F i = Ω.
One can verify that Def. 7 is equivalent to the deﬁnition of Moreno and Wood-
ers (1996). The deﬁnition immediately implies that an all-stage strong corre-
lated equilibrium is also an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. The main
result shows that the converse is also true, and thus the two notions coincide.
Theorem 8 A correlated strategy proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equi-
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librium if and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
3 An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
in a 3-player game, and a speciﬁc deviation that is considered by the grand
coalition during a revealing protocol. At ﬁrst glance, one may think that this
deviation is proﬁtable to all the players conditioned on their posterior infor-
mation at that stage, but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not
the case. The analysis in this example provides the intuition for the use of a
model of incomplete information a` la Aumann (1987), for the common knowl-
edge requirement in Def. 5 of a proﬁtable deviation, and for the main result.
Table 1 presents the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1
chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Table 1
A 3-Player Game With An Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1 c2 c3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
Let q be the proﬁle:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
,
with an expected payoﬀ of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium:
• The proﬁle q is a correlated equilibrium.
• No coalition of two players has a proﬁtable deviation, because their un-
certainty about the action recommended to the third player prevents them
from earning together more than 20 by a joint deviation.
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payoﬀ of 30.
Now, consider a stage of a revealing protocol in which player 1 has received a
recommendation to play a1, player 2 has received a recommendation to play
a2, and player 3 has not received a recommendation yet. No player knows
whether the other players have received their recommended actions. 3 At ﬁrst
glance, the implementation of the deviation d(·) = (a3, b3, c3), which gives a
payoﬀ of (7, 11, 12), may look proﬁtable to all the players: Conditioned on his
3 It is common knowledge that each player has either received his recommended
action or has not recieved any information about it.
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recommended action (a1), player 1 has an expected payoﬀ of 6
2
3
, and thus d
is proﬁtable to him. The same is true for player 2; Player 3 does not know his
recommended action. His ex-ante expected payoﬀ is 10, and he would earn a
payoﬀ of 12 by implementing d.
However, a more thorough analysis reveals that d is unproﬁtable for player 3.
Player 1 can only earn from d if he has received a recommendation to play a1.
Thus, if player 1 agrees to implement d, then it is common knowledge that he
has received a1. The expected payoﬀ of players 2 and 3, conditioned on that
player 1 has received a1, is 11
2
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to implement d (with
a payoﬀ of 11) it is common knowledge that he has more information: his
recommended action is a2. Therefore player 3 knows that if the others agree
to implement d, then their recommended actions are (a1, a2). Conditioned on
that, his expected payoﬀ is 15, and thus d is unproﬁtable for himself.
4 Proof of the Main Result
We now prove the main result. As discussed earlier, one direction immediately
follows from the deﬁnitions, and we only have to prove the other direction:
Theorem 9 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium.
In other words: If a proﬁtable deviation from an agreement q ∈ 4(A) exists,
then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
PROOF. Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a correlated proﬁle that is not an all-stage
strong correlated equilibrium in a game G, (Ω,B, µ) the state space, and
a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle that implements q. There exists a
coalition S ⊆ N with a proﬁtable deviation dS : Ω → AS with respect to
a consistent information structure (F i)i∈S. This implies that there is a state
ω0 ∈ Ω , such that it is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i, uid(ω) > uif (ω),
i.e., Fmeet(ω0) ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. For each deviating player i ∈ S, write
Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) =
⋃˙
j
F ij where the F
i
j are disjoint members of F i, and let
ωij ∈ F ij be a state in F ij . We now construct an ex-ante proﬁtable deviation
dSe with respect to the ex-ante information structure (F ie)i∈S, which satisﬁes
∀i, F ie = Ω: dSe (ω) =

dS(ω) ω ∈ Fmeet,
aS(ω) ω /∈ Fmeet.
Observe that dSe and a
−S are conditionally independent given aS, thus dSe is
well-deﬁned. Let uide(ω), u
i
fe(ω) be the conditional utilities of the players with
respect to (F ie)i∈S. We ﬁnish the proof by showing that dSe is proﬁtable:
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uide(ω)− uife(ω) =
∫
F ie(ω)
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (1)
=
∫
Ω
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (2)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (3)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (4)
=
∑
j
∫
F ij
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (5)
=
∑
j
uid(ω
i
j)− uif (ωij) > 0 (6)
Equation (2) is due to the equality F ie(ω) = Ω, (3) holds since d
S
e = a
−S outside
Fmeet, (4) holds since dSe = d
S in Fmeet, (5) follows from Fmeet =
.⋃
jF
i
j , and
the last inequality is implied by Fmeet ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. QED
5 Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In Sect. 4 we have shown that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is
also appropriate to frameworks in which players can plan deviations at all
stages. A natural question is whether a similar result holds for the notion of
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 4 We show that the answer is negative,
by presenting an example, adapted from Bloch and Dutta (2008), in which
there is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not a self-
enforcing agreement in a framework in which communication is possible at
all stages. Table 2 presents a two-player game and an ex-ante coalition-proof
correlated equilibrium.
Table 2
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
4 An ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy pro-
ﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation
(Moreno and Wooders, 1996). For a coalition of a single player any deviation is self-
enforcing. For a larger coalition, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further
self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions.
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We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in Table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-proof
equilibrium. Observe that it is a correlated equilibrium. Moreno and Wooders
(1996) show that in a two-player game, every correlated equilibrium that is
not Pareto-dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof
correlated equilibrium. The proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ of 4. Thus we
prove that it is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium by showing
that any correlated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most 4. Let
x = q (a1, b1). Observe that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 2 would
have a proﬁtable deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This implies
q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, because otherwise player 1 would have a proﬁtable deviation:
playing a1 when recommended a2. Thus q 's payoﬀ conditioned on that the
recommendation proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at most 4, and
the fact that the payoﬀ of player 1 outside A is at most 3 completes the proof.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
work in which the players can also plan deviations at the ex-post stage. Assume
that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and player 1 has received a
recommendation to play a2. In that case, he can communicate with player 2
at the ex-post stage, tell him that he has received a2 (and thus if the players
follow the recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2), and suggest
a joint deviation: playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive to lie, player 2
would believe him, and they would both play (a3, b3). This ex-post deviation
is self-enforcing because (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same deviation is not self-enforcing at the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviation that changes
(a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 would have a proﬁtable sub-deviation: play-
ing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a deviation
that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 would have a proﬁtable sub-
deviation: playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Discussion
Notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in Moreno
and Wooders (1996), Ray (1996), and Milgrom and Roberts (1996). Our ex-
ante deﬁnition is equivalent to the deﬁnition of Moreno and Wooders. In
Ray (1996) deviating coalitions are not allowed to construct new correlation
devices, and are limited to use only uncorrelated deviations. In Milgrom and
Roberts (1996) only some of the coalitions can coordinate deviations. In both
cases the sets of feasible deviations are included in our set of deviations, and
thus our set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets
of equilibria.
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An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium can be deﬁned in our framework,
as a proﬁle that is resistant to deviations at the ex-post stage when each
player knows his recommendation (i.e., no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure (F i)i∈S, in which:
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∃ai ∈ Ai s.t. ai (F i(ω)) (ai) = 1).
Notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria have been presented in Einy
and Peleg (1995), Ray (1998), and Bloch and Dutta (2008). In Einy and Peleg
(1995) a deviating coalition can only use deviations that improve the condi-
tional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation pro-
ﬁles. 5 In Ray (1998) a coalition S can only use pure deviations (functions
dS : AS → AS). In Bloch and Dutta (2008), a coalition S can only use de-
viations that are implemented if the S-part of the recommendation proﬁle aS
is included in some set ES ⊆ AS, which satisﬁes: (1) If aS ∈ ES, each player
earns from implementing the deviation; (2) If aS /∈ ES, at least one player
looses from implementing the deviation. It can be shown that those condi-
tions imply the existence of a proﬁtable deviation with respect to an ex-post
information structure. 6 Thus our set of ex-post strong correlated equilibria is
included in the other sets of equilibria.
The main result reveals inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of
strong correlated equilibria, which described in Fig. 1. 7 Thus, the ex-ante
notion of Moreno and Wooders is much more robust than originally presented:
It is an appropriate notion not only for frameworks where players can only
communicate before receiving the agreement's recommendations, but for any
pre-play signaling process that is used to implement the agreement, and for
any communication possibilities among the players.
Three possible extensions of the Main Result are:
(1) Bayesian games : Moreno and Wooders (1996) present a notion of ex-ante
strong communication equilibrium in Bayesian games. The main result
can be extended to this setup as well, to show that an ex-ante strong
communication equilibrium is resistant to deviations at all stages.
(2) all-stage Coalition-proofness : By using an appropriate notion of consis-
tent reﬁnements of information structures one can extend our model, and
deﬁne a notion of all-stage coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, . How-
ever, the example in Sect. 5 shows that this notion does not coincide
with the ex-ante coalition-proof notion, nor that there is any inclusion
5 It is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω uid(ω) > uif (ω).
6 The information structure is such that each deviator would know his recommen-
dation and whether aS(ω) ∈ ES .
7 See Moreno and Wooders (1996, Sect. 4) for an example of an ex-post strong
correlated equilibrium that is not an ex-ante equilibrium.
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Figure 1. Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria (SCE)
relations among the diﬀerent coalition-proof notions. 8
(3) k-strong equilibria: In Heller (2008) an ex-ante notion of k-strong corre-
lated equilibrium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all
coalitional deviations of up to k players. The main result can be directly
extended to this notion: An ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium is
resistant to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
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